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REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE WELFARE
BENEFIT PLANS: THE SCOPE OF ERISA'S
PREEMPTION AND THE STATE POWER TO
REGULATE INSURANCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1974 Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,' which was hailed as landmark social legislation in the area of
pension and welfare plan reform.2 It has been characterized as the
"greatest development in the life of the American worker since social
security." 3 ERISA was enacted to remedy many of the defects and
problems associated with employee pension and welfare benefit plans.
A primary objective was to strengthen the private employee benefit
plan system to provide for the retirement and financial security of
employees and their families and, no less importantly, to encourage the
growth of this system. Many employees were losing anticipated pension and welfare benefits because of the lack of vesting provisions, the
financial instability of benefit plans, imprudent investment by plan
trustees, theft of plan assets, and plan termination without adequate
funds to cover accrued liabilities. 5
ERISA is a lengthy and complex regulatory framework setting out
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1,
88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 16, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter cited as ERISA]. ERISA was enacted pursuant to congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce under the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3;

29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976). In order to avoid confusion, section numbers used in the
text will be those of ERISA rather than those of Title 29 U.S.C. Each section will
be footnoted to 29 U.S.C. the first time it is mentioned herein.
2. 120 CONG. REC. 29933 (1974) (remarks of Senator Jacob J. Javits).
3. Id.
4. Vested interest is defined as: "A present right or title to a thing, which carries
with it an existing right of alienation, even though the right to possession or enjoyment
may be postponed to some uncertain time in the future." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1735 (4th ed. 1968). 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976) provides for minimum vesting standards.
However, § 1051 provides that part 2 of ERISA (provisions relating to participation
and vesting) shall not apply to employee welfare benefit plans. See The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV.
539 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ERISA: Policies and Problems], for a detailed explanation of ERISA's vesting provisions.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). See also BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 14, 1978, at 60 for a
rough guide to the magnitude of unfunded pension fund obligations for 100 of the
largest U.S. corporations. It is interesting to note the unfunded vested benefit obligations as a percent of net worth. For example, Lockheed's liability is 185% of its corporate net worth. Of the 100 corporations surveyed, total pension and retirement expenses for their most recent fiscal year equaled $11.8 billion. Id. at 64.
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8
7
standards for welfare 6 and pension plan reporting and disclosure,

0
fiduciary responsibility, 9 administration and enforcement." Included

2
within the Act are elaborate vesting," funding, and termination insurance" requirements which are applicable only to pension plans.
The term, employee benefit plan, as used in ERISA, is the generic
term covering both pension and welfare plans. A welfare plan includes
coverage for medical, hospitalization, and disability benefits. It can
also include dental coverage and prepaid legal plans.' Although an

ERISA objective is welfare plan regulation, pension plans are the main
subject of congressional concern and are the focus of the statutory

scheme." ERISA does not provide for the substantive regulation of
6
benefit requirements for welfare plans.' The result is a statutory

vacuum for welfare plans. Some states have attempted to fill this

vacuum by enacting legislation requiring that certain types of benefits
7
be included in group health insurance' which is purchased by
6. An example welfare benefit plan covered by ERISA is defined as:
[Any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase
of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or
benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or
vacation benefits ...
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976).
7. An employee pension plan within ERISA is defined as:
[Any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such
plan, fund, or program (A) provides retirement income to employees....
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1976).

9.

Id. §§ 1101-1114.

Id.§§ 1131-1144.
Id.§§ 1051-1061.
Id.§§ 1081-1086.
Id. §§ 1301-1381.
See generally Comment, The Effect of ERISA on Prepaid Legal Services, 27
REV. 566 (1975).
L.
BAYLOR
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976); See also ERISA: Policies and Problems, supra note
4, at 549.
16. There is little or no legislative history on the notable absence of such requirements. It could be implied that this area was to be left to the states to regulate.
On the other hand, the detail that was written into section 514 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §
1144 (1976), (the preemption provision), and the detailed exclusions from preemption,
like the applicable criminal laws of a state, negate this argument. 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(4) (1976). No mention is made of exempting state laws that regulate substantive provisions of employee welfare benefit plans.
17. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. chs. 415:18-a, 419:5-a, 420:5-a (Supp. 1977)
(requires that coverage for the treatment of mental illness be included in all group
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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employee welfare benefit plans, or by indirectly regulating welfare
benefit plans.' 8 Many states view this legislation as socially progressive
because it is designed to provide increased benefits and protect against
illusory benefits.' 9 This policy, however, can produce the opposite of
the expected result in some cases and is counter-productive to the goal
of national uniformity sought by Congress.2"
To eliminate conflict with state and local regulation, ERISA grants
control to the federal government over the establishment, conduct,
supervision, and regulation of employee benefit plans. 2' Congress considered the number of employees enrolled in employee benefit plans to
be of such magnitude, and to so affect interstate commerce, that
federal uniform control is necessary to assure minimum standards. 22
To assure federal control ERISA contains sweeping preemption
language. Section 514(a) states that ERISA "shall supersede any and
all state laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit
plan. "23
Notwithstanding its broad language, section 514 has spawned
litigation over the extent to which ERISA preempts state law.2
ERISA's scope of preemption is a question of great importance not
only to state legislators and insurance regulators, but also to employers
who maintain employee benefit plans. The states need to know the extent to which their insurance laws are preempted. Employers need to
be aware of the state law with which they must comply in administering employee welfare benefit plans. The judiciary has been called on to
health insurance policies); N.Y. INS. LAW § 162-a (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1977-1978)
(requires group health insurance to provide coverage for maternity care).
18. See notes 54-57 and accompanying text infra.
19. See Kline, ERISA: Preemption & Prepaid, 1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SER-

6 (1978); Brummond, FederalPreemption of State Insurance Regulation Under
ERISA, 62 IOWA L. REV. 57 (1976).
VICES

20. See notes 21-22 and accompanying text infra.
21. National Bank of N. America v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers,
400 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described
in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.
This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
24. See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 1630 (1978); Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal.
1977); Old Stone Bank v. Michaelson, 439 F. Supp. 252 (D.R.I. 1977); Wayne
Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind. 1977),
modified, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp.
1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978).
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arbitrate this conflict.2" Much of the litigation concerning ERISA's
preemptive scope has dealt with the states' power to mandate substantive benefits in welfare plans.2 6,
This comment focuses on employee welfare benefit plans and examines the legislative history prior to enactment of ERISA as well as
legislative material subsequent to enactment. To understand ERISA's
preemptive scope and the effect which state laws mandating specific
coverages have upon welfare benefit plans, an analysis of section 514 is
necessary. An examination of the interpretation of section 514 by the
courts illustrates its practical effect upon state laws mandating specific
health coverage.

II.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT To PREEMPT

ERISA specifically repealed the Welfare and Pension Plan
Disclosure Act of 1958.2" The Disclosure Act recognized and preserved
state authority to prescribe regulations for the operation and administration of employee 'welfare and pension benefit plans.2 8 It also

provided for a reporting system which required plan administrators to
file plan descriptions and annual reports with the Secretary of Labor.
Reports were to be furnished upon request to plan participants. Nevertheless, this Act, characterized as a "glorified filing system," 2 9 proved
inadequate because it failed to provide the Secretary with enforcement
powers.3 0 Out of this shortcoming grew ERISA.
25. Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear actions brought
under §§ 1001-1144 except when brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover
benefits or to enforce or clarify rights under the plan. In this case state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1976).
26. See, e.g., cases cited note 24 supra.
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1970) (repealed by 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a) (1976)).
28. Id. § 309; See S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1958]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4137, 4137.
29. ERISA: Policies and Problems, supra note 4 (quoting Administration Proposal to Amend the 1958 Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act: Hearings on S.
1994 before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1961); see also 120 CONG. REC. 20194 (1974)),
quoted at 544.
30. See ERISA: Policies and Problems, supra note 4. Under the Disclosure Act it
was anticipated that participants would police their own plans by obtaining plan
descriptions and annual reports from the Secretary of Labor. However, this reliance
on participant policing proved unworkable since the plans were often so complex that
"an average plan participant, even where he has been furnished an explanation of his
plan provisions, often [could] not comprehend them because of the technicalities and
complexities of the language used." HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR,
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT SECURITY ACT OF 1973, H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4646. ERISA contains a provision which requires plan descriptions to "be written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the average plan particpant." 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (1976).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/7
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Through ERISA, Congress intended to establish a single, uniform
regulatory scheme for employee benfit plans. ERISA's broad preemption has been described by one supporter as its crowning achievement,
in that the sole power to control and regulate employee benefit plans
was reserved to the federal government. 3 ' Legislative history reveals
that Congress considered limited preemption, but rejected it in favor
of a broader scope of preemption. 2 The original House version would
have limited preemption to specific enumerated areas of federal regulation under ERISA such as reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility." The original Senate version would have restricted preemption
to the subject matters regulated by ERISA. 3 ' After careful consideration, a joint conference committee" rejected both the House and
Senate versions and drafted the language which was ultimately enacted
as section 514, the preemption section of ERISA. 3'
The rationale behind broad preemption was to eliminate the
threat
of inconsistent state and local regulation,3" and to avoid "the possibility of endless litigation over ...potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal with some particular aspect of private welfare or
pension benefit plans." 3" As finally passed, ERISA preempted not just
state laws relating to reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility,
but superseded all state laws which in any way relate to employee
benefit plans.39 Congress made its intent clear.'
31. 120 CONG. REC. 29197 (1974) (remarks of Representative Dent, Chairman of
the House Subcommittee on Labor, one of ERISA's sponsors and most ardent supporters).
32. Id.
33. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 4742 (1974) provides in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that ... the provisions of
Part 1 of this subtitle shall supersede any and all laws of the States and of political
subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the reporting
and disclosure responsibilities, and fiduciary responsibilities, of persons acting on
behalf of any employee benefit plan.
34. The Senate version, H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 5002
(1974), provides in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that ... the provisions of
this Act or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act shall supersede any and
all laws of the States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they now or
hereafter relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act or the Welfare and
Pension Plan Disclosure Act.
35. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5038.
36.
37.

29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976).
120 CONG. REC. 29933 (1974) (remarks of Senator Harrison Williams, Jr.).
See also H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5038. See generally Brummond, supra note 19.
38. 120 CONG. REC. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Senator Jacob J. Javits).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976).
40. A broad preemption provision eliminat[es] not only conflicting state laws
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SECTION 514 OF ERISA-THE PREEMPTIVE LANGUAGE

An analysis of the interrelationship of the clauses within section
514 indicates a unified scheme for exclusive federal control over

employee benefit plans. Section 514(a),' the relating clause, lays the
2
foundation for the scope of preemption. Section 514(b)(2)(A), the

savings clause, and section 514(b)(2)(B),

3

the deemer clause, refine the

scope of section 514(a).
A.

The Relating Clause

Section 514(a) states in pertinent part that ERISA "shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee
benefit plan.'"4 4 This section defines the parameters of preemption so
that any relation to an employee benefit plan by a state law, is prohibited. "Relate" is a broad and imprecise term and it will be left to
the courts to define it. "Relate," however, is not equivalent to
"regulate," which implies a narrower preemptive scope. A state law
which mandates what benefits an employee will receive under a welfare
plan is a law which "relates" to an employee benefit plan, whether or
not it directly regulates the plan, and therefore would be preempted.
Additional support for a broad interpretation is found in section

514(c)(2). "The term 'State' includes a State, any political subdivision

thereof, . . . which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the
5
terms and conditions of employee benefit plans."91 It is difficult to
pursuing the same regulatory goals as the federal laws but also any state rule or action, however meritorious, that might in any way interfere with or make more
burdensome the establishment or operation of employee benefit plans.
All measures at the state level that would regulate any aspect of a plan are invalidated by the broad sweep of the preemption, even if the aspect is not addressed by the federal law. They need not even be directed specifically to employee
benefit plans but may only affect them as part of a more general class.

Pfennigstorf and Kimball, Employee Legal Service Plans: Conflicts Between Federal
and State Regulation, 1976 AM. B.F. RES. J. 787, 831-32 (1976).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976); see note 23 supra.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1976) provides in part: "[Elxcept as provided in
subparagraph (B), nothing in this title shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking or securities."
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1976) provides:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)],
which is not exempt under section 4(b) [29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)] (other than a plan
established primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust
established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in
the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trusts companies, or investment companies.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/7

1979]

COMMENTS

determine why Congress sought to combat the problem of indirect
state regulation in this subsection as opposed to in the relating clause.
The legislative history is silent on this particular point. Regardless of
where the prohibition against indirect state regulation appears, it
nevertheless aids in defining the preemptive scope.
B.

The Savings Clause

Congress clarified the extent of preemption by preserving state
authority in those areas of traditional insurance regulation. Section
514(b)(2)(A), the savings clause, states in relevant part that ERISA
"shall [not] be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law
of any state which regulates insurance."
This clause has been the source of much confusion. The savings
clause reflects the policy of the McCarron-Ferguson Act, 6 which left
the states the power to regulate the business of insurance.4 7 That Act
provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically
' 48
relates to the business of insurance."
"The business of insurance ' 49 was interpreted by the Supreme
Court in SEC v. National Securities, Inc. 50 The Court stated that laws
which focus on the relationship between the insurance company and
the policy holder, such as the selling and advertising of policies and the
licensing of companies and their agents were included within the concept of the business of insurance. 5 "[T]he type of policy which could
be issued, its reliability, interpretation and enforcement-these [are]
' 52
the core of the 'business of insurance'.
State mandated benefit coverage for welfare benefit plans does affect the type of policy which can be issued by insurers to employee
benefit plans. Thus, those state laws which fall within the purview of
the business of insurance are not superseded by any federal act unless
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1976). This legislation was enacted in response to
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), which held
that the business of insurance was interstate in nature and was thus subject to federal
regulation.
47.

29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1976) also supports this proposition. Subsection (d) pro-

vides that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States (except as provided in section 111 [29 U.S.C. § 1031] and 307(b) [29 U.S.C. § 1137(b)] ) or any rule or regulation
issued under any such law."
48.
49.

15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976).
Id.

50.
51.

393 U.S. 453 (1969).
Id. at 460.

52.

Id.
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the act specifically relates to the business of insurance. ERISA does
not purport to extend its regulations to the insurance industry as a
whole, nor was it intended to reach so far." It does, however, relate to
the business of insurance insofar as it regulates employee benefit plans.
Reading the savings clause and the relating clause together, and noting
the preemption under the McCarron-Ferguson Act if a federal act
relates to the business of insurance, leads to the conclusion that state
laws which regulate the business of insurance and also relate to an
employee benefit plan are preempted.
C.

The Deemer Clause

Section 514(b)(2)(B), the deerer clause, states in pertinent part
that "an employee benefit plan.., shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance company or . . . engaged in the business of insurance ... for
purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies. "4 The deemer clause was enacted to further clarify the field
which Congress intended ERISA to preempt. This clause represents a
congressional attempt to prevent a state from regulating an employee
benefit plan through circumvention of the relating clause by claiming
the power to regulate a plan under the savings clause. Consequently, a
state may not label any ERISA plan as being in the business of insurance in order to subject it to state insurance law.II Such state action
would defeat a primary goal of ERISA "to reserve to federal authority
the sole 6 power to regulate the field of covered employee benefit
5
plans."
When both sections (a) and (b) of section 514 are examined
together, it becomes clear that Congress intended total federal control
over employee benefit plans. The relating clause indicates the area of
state law to be preempted while the savings clause preserves state
primacy in the relationship between the insurer and the insured and indicates the laws Congress did not intend to preempt. Relation to an
employee benefit plan is the mechanism which triggers preemption.
The savings clause would preserve a state law that regulated the licensing of insurance agents, regardless of whether the agent sold insurance
to an employee welfare benefit plan." ' Congress did not intend such a
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1976).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1976).
55. See Brummond, supra note 19, at 98-99, which suggests that self-insured
plans satisfy the accepted elements of an insurance arrangement, and that the
presumption in section 514(b)(2)(B) that these plans are not insurance is somewhat surprising. The author also suggests that it may be possible for the Burger Court to strike
down the deemer clause if it finds no rational basis to support the presumption.
56. Guthrie v. Dow Chemical Co., 445 F. Supp. 311, 314 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
57. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/7
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law to be preempted. When the state law mandates what type of insurance a welfare benefit plan must purchase, however, it is directly
regulating employee benefit plans and should therefore be preempted.
IV.

CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS-A CASE LAW OVERVIEW

The courts which have had occasion to interpret section 514 are
divided on the question of the scope of preemption. Several courts
desiring to uphold state law have ascribed a limited scope of preemption to ERISA by relying on the savings clause.5 8 Others have held that
any control over employee welfare benefit plans triggers preemption. 9
A.

Narrow Reading of Preemption

The leading case adopting a narrow view of preemption is
Wadsworth v. Whaland,60 which involved a New Hampshire law that
required all insurers issuing group health insurance policies in the state
to include coverage for mental illness. 61 Several welfare benefit plan
administrators sought an injunction against enforcement claiming the
law was preempted by ERISA.6 2 The adminstrators argued that by imposing mandatory mental illness coverage on group health insurance
policies the state law indirectly imposed control on the benefits an
employee would receive under an employee welfare benefit plan. Thus
they claimed that the law related to plans covered by ERISA and was
preempted. 63 However, the court was not persuaded by this
reasoning.64
The Wadsworth court interpreted ERISA as mandating broad
preemption. Although New Hampshire's law indirectly related to
employee welfare benefit plans and would appear to be subject to
preemption, the court concluded preemption was not automatic
because of the application of the savings clause. Despite the broad
58. See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied 98
S. Ct. 1630 (1978); Old Stone Bank v. Michaelson, 439 F. Supp. 252 (D.R.I. 1977).

59. See Hewlett-Packard v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd,
571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978); Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp.,
426-F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind.), modified, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977); see generally
Okin, Preemption of State Insurance Regulation by ERISA, 13 FORUM 652 (1978).
60. 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1630 (1978).
61. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. chs. 415:18-a, 419:5-a, 420:5-a.
62. 562 F.2d at 72-73.
63. Id. at 76.
64. The court stated: "[w]e agree with plaintiffs that Chapter 57 is a law which indirectly relates to employee benefit plans and is subject to preemption. However, we
cannot agree that preemption necessarily follows. Chapter 57 is also a state law
regulating insurance and is expressly exempted from preemption by section
514(b)(2)(A) [the savings clause]." Id. at 77.
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scope of preemption ascribed to ERISA, the net effect of the decision
is a considerable narrowing of the preemptive scope.
The Wadsworth court, in effect, applied the clauses within section
514 in an order reverse from that in which they are written. Implied in
the court's reasoning is that the initial inquiry should be whether the
contested state law is a law that regulates the business of insurance,
falling within the savings clause, section 514(b)(2)(A). If the answer is
affirmative, the court should hold that preemption does not occur. If
the answer is negative, then the court should determine whether the
law relates to the employee benefit plan, falling within the relating
clause, section 514(a). If so, then preemption occurs. The court's
reasoning emphasizes a clause representing a "distinctly subordinate
policy within the section" 6 5 when it considers that the savings clause
66
rather than the relating clause controls the scope of preemption.
This decision has been followed by courts that are desirous of
upholding state law and need a basis to find narrow preemption
because the legislative67 history and the words of section 514 do not support such a finding.
8
In Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton" the court faced a
situation almost identical to that in Wadsworth. The Minnesota Comprehensive Health Insurance Act 69 required all insurers that issue
health insurance policies to provide a minimum level of benefits. It
also required employers who offer health care plans to their employees
to provide a particular type of health plan. Plaintiff insurance companies brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the Minnesota law claiming ERISA preempted the area. The court held the statute was not
preempted because it was also a law that regulated the business of insurance.70 The court acknowledged its narrow reading of section 514.
It reasoned that the conflict between ERISA and state law must be
65.

HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., ERISA

OVERSIGHT REPORT OF THE PENSION TASK FORCE 9 (Comm. Print 1977).

With respect to regulation of the activities of certain employee benefit plans ....
federal authority has been expressly extended to occupy the field to the exclusion
of state authority subject to certain exceptions. These exceptions are designed to
delineate affirmatively the limits of the "field" preempted by section 514(a), and
articulate a second, but distinctly subordinate policy within the section of preserving state authority insofar as it does not relate to any plan.
Id.
66. See Brummond, supra note 19, at 66-67, which also puts forth this order of
inquiry in determining whether a state insurance law is preempted by ERISA.
67. See Hamberlin v. VIP Insurance Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977);
Old Stone Bank v. Michaelson, 439 F. Supp. 252 (D.R.I. 1977).
68. 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
69. MINN.STAT. ANN. § 62E.01 (West Supp. 1976).
70. 423 F. Supp. at 926.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/7
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very clear in order to trigger preemption; 7' in effect the court adopted
the original Senate version of limited preemption. 2
The pivotal point in these cases is that the challenged state laws
were not intended to control or regulate employee benefit plans. 73 The
state laws were directed at regulating an area within the state's power
to regulate-the business of insurance.74 Therefore, the fact that the
law as enforced relates to employee benefit plans is incidental.
Under the reasoning of the Wadsworth decision and cases following its reasoning, 5 state laws regulating the benefits an employee
receives under a group insurance plan will be upheld even though the
result infringes on employee welfare benefit plans. Under the narrow
view this will be tolerated even though it contravenes the expressed intent of Congress to completely occupy the field of employee benefit
plans.7 6
71. Id.
72. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
73. Section 514 makes no mention of a state law's intent in defining the scope of
preemption. See also Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 1630 (1978).
74. New York is an example of another state which imposes control over the content of health insurance policies. In Health Ins. Ass'n of America v. Harnett, 89 Misc.
2d 795, 395 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1977), the plaintiffs sought a declaration of unconstitutionality of a New York law that requires every health insurance policy issued in the
state to include coverage for maternity care. The court upheld the law; however, it was
not challenged on grounds of preemption by ERISA. See also 30 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB.
257 (1976).
75. In Hamberlin v. VIP Insurance Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977), the
court quoted extensively from Insurer's Action Council. The court concluded that
ERISA's preemptive scope was narrow. See also Old Stone Bank v. Michealson, 439 F.
Supp. 252 (D.R.I. 1977). Here the court was confronted with a situation similar to that
in Wadsworth. The bank adopted an ERISA pension plan which included four investment options. Rhode Island law, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-17 (1968), required the State
Board of Bank Incorporation's approval of the investment options before they could
be implemented. The Board denied approval. The bank sought an injunction, claiming
the law was preempted by ERISA. The court relied on Wadsworth to hold that the
Rhode Island law was not preempted. The court stated that the law was designed to
regulate banking activities and not employee benefit plans, and therefore came within
the scope of the savings clause. The court went on to hold that merely because the
banking activities are prompted by a plan regulated by ERISA, the Board is not
deprived of its jurisdiction. As in Wadsworth, the Old Stone Bank court chose the
policy of state regulation over federal control of ERISA plans.
76. A tangentially related preemption question arising under the savings clause
concerns securities law. The savings clause also exempts from preemption state
securities laws. This area is being pulled into the arena of controversy through Daniel
v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232
(1978). The defendants argued against a claim that a participant's interest in a pension
plan is a security, that ERISA repealed the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts insofar as they apply to union pension funds. The court partially rejected
this argument finding it "unwarranted to impute an intent on the part of Congress for
ERISA to override the federal or state securities laws." Id. at 1249.
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Broad Reading of Preemption

The broad view of preemption "that Congress intended absolute
preemption of the field of employee benefit plans"" is best
demonstrated by the decision in Hewlett-PackardCo. v. Barnes."' The
79
California Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act regulated the
delivery of health care services to residents who participate in health
care plans. The Act also sought to regulate self-funded plans. California considered these plans to be a unique form of insurance arrangement and thus subject to state law because of its power to regulate the
business of insurance.8 0 The plaintiffs were administrators of plans
covered by ERISA as well as by the Knox-Keene Act. The plan administrators challenged the Act on the grounds that it was preempted
by ERISA." The court agreed and held that the Act was preempted to
the extent that it applied to employee welfare benefit plans.
The state argued that because the Knox-Keene Act regulated the
business of insurance it was saved from preemption by the savings
clause. In essence the state was deeming self-funded plans to be in the
business of insurance and thereby claiming the power to regulate them
in direct contravention of the prohibition in the deemer clause. The
court stated:
In seeking to regulate plaintiffs' plans pursuant to Knox-Keene under the
theory that the statute applies to and that such plans constitute "insurance," defendant contravenes the clear intent of Section 514(a) and
(b) of ERISA that employee benefit plans, so dubbed or under any other
name, be free of state regulation.'
In response to the Danieldecision, Senators Williams and Javits have introduced S.
3017, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 274 (1978), to clarify the applicability of federal and state
securities laws to plans subject to ERISA. Section 274 provides that ERISA supersedes
federal and state securities laws to the extent that such laws may be applied to the interest of an employee in an employee benefit plan.
Another case considering the extent of ERISA's preemptive scope is now pending
before the United States District Court for Connecticut. Nat'l Carriers' Conference
Comm. v. Heffernan, 440 F. Supp. 128 (D. Conn. 1977). The issue is whether a state
may tax benefits paid by an employee welfare benefit plan to participants and
beneficiaries. The savings clause exempts from preemption state insurance, banking
and securities laws but not state tax laws.
See also Air Line Pilots Ass'n. Int'l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 1138
(D.D.C. 1978) (where ERISA was found not to have preempted the Railway Labor
Act); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978); 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 358
(1976).
77. Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F. Supp. 473, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
78. 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978).
79. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1340-1399.64 (West Supp. 1971-1977).
80. 425 F. Supp. at 1300.
81. Id. at 1296.
82. Id. at 1300.
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In contrast, the Wadsworth court construed the deemer clause as
supporting state supremacy in the regulation of insurance. 83 The court
stated that "on its face the deemer provision does not prohibit a state
from indirectly affecting plans by regulating the contents of group insurance policies purchased by the plans." 8 ' The Wadsworth court,
however, failed in its reading to incorporate the prohibition against indirect state regulation found in section 514(c)(2).'
The Hewlett-Packarddecision has been followed in several other
cases. 8 6 Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act, 87 which required all
workers to be covered by a comprehensive prepaid health care plan
with minimum benefit levels, 88 was held preempted by ERISA in Standard Oil Co. of California v. Agsalud.89 The court noted the absence
of ERISA provisions dealing with substantive benefits and the absence
of legislative history on this particular point, but nevertheless concluded it could not contravene the plain meaning of the statute.90 The state
argued that ERISA and the Act should be allowed to coexist since they
regulated different spheres of employee welfare benefit plans and that,
in any event, Hawaii's Act did not relate to those aspects of employee
welfare benefit plans covered by ERISA. The court replied that
'[there is simply no basis in the language of [section] 514(a) for
distinguishing between types of state laws all of which 'relate to'
employee benefit plans. When Congress says 'any and all State laws'
courts cannot conclude that Congress really meant to say 'some but

not all State laws.'
C.

",92

CollateralEffects of the Broad Reading of Preemption

Although broad preemption should prevent litigation over the
preemption question because preemption would 'be automatic, it does
have the adverse effect of creating certain vacuums in the regulation of
83. 562 F.2d at 78.
84. Id.
85. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
86. See, e.g., Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp.
316 (N.D. Ind.), modified, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977); Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit
Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
87. HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 393-1 to 393-51 (1976).
88. Id.at § 393-11.
89. 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977). In response to this decision, Representatives Heftel and Akaka have introduced H.R. 6944, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977),
which would amend ERISA to clarify the status of Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Law
as not preempted by ERISA.
90. Id.at 706-07.
91. Id.at 706.
92. Id.at 707.
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93
the substantive content of employee welfare benefit plans. The courts
that have been faced with such a situation have begun to fashion a
federal common law.
4
In Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp.9 the
district court recognized ERISA's broad preemptive scope and found
state law inoperative. As a result, the court found it necessary to
95
fashion a federal rule of decision. The court ordered the defendant
insurer to issue a conversion policy for a plan participant although the
insurer claimed that coverage had been transferred to another insurer.
The court used state law on this point as a guide in fashioning its
96
order. In Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust the court stated that implicit
in section 514(a) was the development of a federal common law with
9
respect to employee benefit plans.
A few resourceful entrepreneurs have attempted to take advantage
of ERISA's broad preemption of state law. The scheme is to set up a
group insurance plan and characterize it as a "welfare benefit plan" in
an effort to avoid state law which regulates insurance companies.
These ventures are known as multiple employer trusts, commonly called "METS."
"S
In Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Association the court blocked this tactic, stating that "just as a state cannot regulate an employee
benefit plan by calling it 'insurance,' neither can defendants . . . be
free of state regulation by terming [their plan] an employee benefit
plan." 99 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Wayne Chemical,
1°
Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp., 0 used this rationale to
sidestep the preemption issue, and found that the plan in question was
not an ERISA plan and thus was subject to state law. Finding these
commercial insurance plans outside the scope of ERISA comports with
the legislative history. "Where a 'plan' is, in effect, an entrepreneurial
1
venture, it is outside the policy of section 514." 0
The dichotomy between the narrow and broad readings of preemption can best be understood in the context of intent versus effect. The

93. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra; see also Ellis v. Lionikis, 152
N.J. Super. 321, 377 A.2d 1208 (1977).
94. 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind.), modified, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
95. Id.at 321.
96. 570 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1977).
97.

98.
99.
100.
court's
101.

Id. at 413.

437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
Id. at 390.
567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977). The court of appeals modified the district
finding of broad preemption.
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No. 94-1785, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1977).
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Hewlett-Packardstandard of analysis focuses on the effect that state
law has on employee welfare benefit plans. The Wadsworth standard
of analysis focuses on the intent of the state regulation which relates to
employee welfare benefit plans.' 2 Thus, under the Wadsworth rationale, indirect regulation of employee welfare benefit plans will be
tolerated if the state's intent is to regulate the business of insurance.
Regulating the content of group health insurance policies is clearly
within the purview of the McCarron-Ferguson Act. It is the regulation
of the business of insurace which at the same time relates to employee
benefit plans. Clearly, both congressional policies of reserving to the
states the regulation of the business of insurance and of total federal
control over employee benefit plans cannot be fully implemented. A
balanced compromise can be struck by preempting state law only insofar as it applies to employee benefit plans. This reconciliation leaves
to the states the power to regulate the business of insurance outside the
field of employee benefit plans while assuring the federal government
control over employee welfare benefit plans.
Should Congress decide to amend section 514 to further clarify the
preemptive scope, it should consider the effect analysis of state law.
Regardless of a state's intent in enacting a law which relates to
employee welfare benefit plans, the net result is infringement in an
area reserved to federal control.
In the four years since ERISA's enactment the effects of judicial
interpretations have begun to make themselves felt. The Pension Task
Force ' " recognized this problem and attempted to point out the
breadth of section 514, stating that "with respect to regulation of the
activities of certain employee benefit plans (those subject to ERISA
jurisdiction), federal authority has been expressly extended to occupy
the field to the exclusion of state authority ... leav[ing] no room for
effective state regulation."' 0'° The Task Force went on to reiterate the
purpose behind ERISA's broad preemption by concluding that "the
102. The Wadsworth court noted that there was no intent on the part of New
Hampshire to directly regulate plaintiffs' plans. Section 514, however, makes no mention of a state law's intent when defining what laws are preempted.
103. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1221-1222 (Supp. 1978) provides for the formation of a Joint
Pension Task Force which is to report to Congress on the implementation of ERISA.
One of the matters to be studied by the Task Force and reported on to Congress was
the effect of federal preemption of state law.
104.

HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., OVERSIGHT

REPORT OF THE PENSION TASK FORCE 9 (Comm. Print 1977),
OVERSIGHT REPORT]. The Task Force recently held hearings on

[hereinafter cited as
the preemption issue
and the ERISA Industry Committee and The American Council of Life Insurance and
The Health Insurance Association of America indicated strong support for ERISA's
preemption of state laws that regulate employee benefit plans. See This Week in Congress, June 2, 1978.
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Federal interest and the need for national uniformity are so great that
0 5
enforcement of state regulation should be precluded."'
If ERISA is not amended to include a firmer congressional directive, states will continue to mandate certain coverage requirements.
The states believe they can increase employee benefits under welfare
benefit plans and further protect their residents. Substantive benefit requirements by states are seen as desirable in that they prevent an
employer with substantial bargaining power from creating a plan with
minimal coverage. State substantive regulation may also permit states
to experiment with various types of benefit plans and to adapt them to
°6
peculiar local conditions in each state."
Conversely, there are practical considerations which militate
against continued state regulation. The cost of compliance with state
laws that require specific coverages is pushing some plans close to
bankruptcy.'"" Plan administrators may be forced to drop other
desired oenefits' °8 in order to supply state mandated benefits and still
09
keep the costs reasonable and affordable.' For benefit plans covering
workers in more than one state, the administration expense necessary
to comply with numerous state requirements is an obvious burden. An
additional impact of state regulation is to deny plan participants the
right to choose the coverage package they desire.110
ERISA was enacted to assure that the working populace would
105. OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 104, at 9. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
But cf. SENATE COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., lST SESS., OVERSIGHT OF
ERISA (1977) (Senator Javits expressed concern that section 514 may have gone further than desired. It should be noted that this was not a report by the Pension Task
Force). Id. at 61.
106. See Brummond, supra note 19, at 117.
107. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 1630 (1978) (plaintiff administrators argued that bankruptcy was a possible result
of compliance with state law which required certain benefits).
108. "In one case, a union welfare plan in New Hampshire was forced to discontinue vision and dental coverage for participants to pay for the cost of adding statemandated mental health care coverage to the plan." BUSINESS INSURANCE, June 12,
1978, at 6, col. 4.
109. This cost is forcing some employers to become uninsured or self-insured. See
Brummond, supra note 19; see also Statement by William Gibb before the Senate
Human Resources Subcommittee on Labor and the Senate Finance Subcommittee on
Private Pension Plans and Employee Fringe Benefits, (August 17, 1978), at 31.
110. BUSINESS INSURANCE, June 12, 1978, at 6, col. 1. (remarks of Representative
Erlinborn).
The plans are established and the level of contributions are stipulated by collective
bargaining agreements. However, the benefits to be received under the welfare plans
are not stipulated, they are determined by the plan administrators with the aid of insurance consultants. Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 1630 (1978).
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receive pension benefits upon retirement and welfare plan benefits.'
Should some plans be forced to discontinue some needed benefits
because of state requirements, the purpose of ERISA to secure
employee benefits under these plans and national uniformity would be
partially defeated." 2 Although ERISA protects the quantifiable
aspects of welfare benefits plans, it does not cover the qualitative
aspects. State mandated benefits may fail to meet the needs of
employees and their families and thus threaten their financial security,
which is a primary goal of ERISA, by forcing employees to pay extra
for the benefits they prefer to those required by state law." ' This
should be an area of primary concern for the Pension Task Force.
D.

Concernfor Federalism

A key consideration in the ultimate success of either the broad or
narrow readings of section 514's preemption of employee welfare plans
may well be the Burger Court's concern for federalism. In recent years
there has been an effort by the Burger Court to favor the state when
there is a preemption question."'
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the preemption
doctrine reveal an inclination to uphold state regulation when challenged on preemption grounds." 5 The Supreme Court stated in Jones v.
Rath Packing Co.'" that when "the field which Congress is said to
have preempted has been traditionally occupied by the States... 'we
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress."" 7 The states' power to regulate
the business of insurance would be given great weight as an area traditionally occupied by the states. An argument can be made, however,
111. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4890.
112. As for pension plans, "more terminations have occurred in the nearly four
years since ERISA's enactment than in the previous four decades." Mulock, The
Positive Side of ERISA: Quadrupled Contributions and Insurance in Certain Defined
Benefit Plans for Closely Held Corporations, CERTIFIED LIFE UNDERWRITER J. July,
1978, at 29. See also note 5 supra.
113. See note 2-5 and accompanying text supra.
114. See 3 U. DAY. L. REV. 237 (1978). It is beyond the scope of this comment to
adequately discuss the preemption doctrine. See generally 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623
(1975) for an excellent treatment of the subject. Hirsch, Toward A New View of
Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515 (1972).
115. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). See also Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal
Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REV. 51 (1973).
116. 430 U.S. 519, rehearing denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977).
117. Id. at 525 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 381 U.S. 218, 230
(1967)).
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that a literal reading of section 514 and its legislative history reveal a
"clear and manifest purpose of Congress" ' 8 to entirely control the
field of employee benefit plans. Nonetheless, given the current posture
of the Supreme Court," 9 the presumption in favor of state laws that
mandate certain coverages be provided by employee benefits plans is
one that may prove difficult to overcome.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is evident that Congress intended, through the enactment of section 514, to regulate the entire field of employee benefit plans. 20
Although pension plan security is the major objective of ERISA,
welfare benefit plans are nevertheless included within ERISA's
regulatory scheme.
Congress intended only to preempt state law insofar as it relates to
employee benefit plans. ERISA is not an attempt to completely deprive
the states of their power to regulate insurance. The states' power to
regulate the business of insurance is reaffirmed by the savings clause.
Congress saw the need for national uniformity and control and sought
to remove only the field of employee benefit plans from state control.
Section 514 specifically preempts state laws which mandate certain
substantive coverage in employee benefit plans. If Congress desires to
exercise total control over employee benefit plans and regain what has
been lost through the states' regulation of the content of welfare
benefit plans, then new legislation is needed-possibly in the form of
an amendment to section 514. Further study is needed to decide among
at least three alternatives: (1) regulating the content of welfare plans on
a national scale so that ERISA would not only protect whatever
benefits are already provided by a welfare plan but would also regulate
the quality of benefits it provides; (2) regulating the content by the
states because of the need to adapt to local exigencies; or (3) allowing
the content of welfare plans to be determined by the free play of the
market if bargainers are in fairly equal positions.
As the two views of ERISA's preemptive scope take shape, their
implication should be carefully considered. Some state laws mandating
substantive benefits are allowed to stand and regulate employee
welfare benefit plans. Other state regulations are preempted and overturned. Substantive benefit provisions of welfare plans should have
received more attention at the time of ERISA's enactment. Investiga118.
119.
120.

Id.
See 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
See notes 27-40 and accompanying text supra.
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195

tion of the current operation of employee welfare benefit plans and the
need for regulation of substantive benefits should be a major concern
of the Pension Task Force.
Molly B. Kenny
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